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1. Introduction 
As democratic representatives, political leaders are ex-
pected to be responsive and able to relate to their fol-
lowers’ daily concerns (Flinders, 2012; Lijphart, 1999; 
Reicher, Haslam, & Platow, 2014). After all, elected 
leaders are given a mandate by citizens to act on their 
behalf (Manin, 1997). According to democratic theory, 
political leaders respond to this need for responsive-
ness among others because of the threat of electoral 
sanction and moral obligation (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 
2005; Thomassen, 1994). There is thus an implicit as-
sumption that responsiveness results in public support 
of party supporters for political leaders, for example in 
terms of perceived credibility (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; 
Reicher et al., 2014). 
While the extent to which leaders should follow 
and voice citizens’ concerns is debated (Thomassen, 
1994), surveys show citizens are dissatisfied with the 
responsiveness of their leaders who are regularly per-
ceived as elitist and technocratic (Hay, 2007; Hendriks, 
Van der Krieken, Van Zuydam, & Roelands, 2016; 
Reicher et al., 2014). In the public debate, the gap be-
tween political leaders and citizens’ positions on the 
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European Union (EU) is seen as especially pronounced. 
After decades of ‘permissive consensus’ in which citi-
zens seemed content to leave European affairs in the 
hands of their leaders, the current public debate shows 
signs of a ‘dismissive dissensus’: European affairs have 
become highly polarised, Eurosceptic parties have won 
support, and trust in the EU has declined (De Wilde & 
Zürn, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Van den Berg & 
Van Eijk, 2012). Intriguingly, however, academic studies 
provide mixed evidence for the existence of a gap be-
tween leaders and their followers on European issues 
(Arnold, Sapir, & Zapryanova, 2012; Carruba, 2001; 
Lindeboom, 2012; Steenbergen, Edwards, & De Vries, 
2007; cf. Dekker & Den Ridder, 2011; Walczak & Van 
der Brug, 2012). Both in terms of pro/anti-European or 
left/right ideological orientation as well as issue salien-
cy, studies find a relatively close correspondence be-
tween government and citizens preferences. Still, a 
substantial group of citizens feel unheard by their polit-
ical leaders (Hendriks et al., 2016). 
This article therefore introduces an alternative type 
of congruence—narrative congruence—to study the 
responsiveness of political leaders’ positions on the EU 
that might shed light on the discrepancy between citi-
zens’ dissatisfaction with their leaders and the relative 
high congruence found in many studies. In addition, we 
explore whether congruence indeed coincides with at-
tributed credibility to political leaders. This article thus 
aims to answer the question whether narrative con-
gruence exists between political leaders and their fol-
lowers and if this form of congruence fosters leaders’ 
credibility ratings. To answer this question, the tech-
nique of cognitive mapping is used. Unlike the more 
common elite interviews and surveys, this technique 
allows us to determine traditional congruence 
measures like issue saliency and ideological distance as 
well as the overlap in the narratives in which leaders’ 
and followers’ positions are rooted. Moreover, in con-
trast to traditional narrative analyses, cognitive map-
ping allows the narratives of large groups of citizens to 
be studied and aggregated (Gaxie, Hubé, & Rowell, 
2011; Van Inglegom, 2014). 
Empirically this article focuses on Dutch EU politics 
as a first test of the concept and measure of narrative 
congruence and its effects on leaders’ credibility. Since 
the Dutch ‘no’ to the European constitution in 2005, a 
lack of trust in EU politics has become a prevalent phe-
nomenon for the traditionally pro-European Dutch. 
Combined with the notion that The Netherlands has 
one of the most proportional representative political 
systems in the world—increasing the chance of finding 
a political leader who is responsive to your beliefs 
(Golder & Stramsky, 2010; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 
2005)—it constitutes a critical case for responsive EU 
leadership and is therefore interesting for a first probe 
into a new concept and method. Specifically, in this 
study the European beliefs of four Dutch political lead-
ers most visible in the debate in the months surround-
ing the 2014 EP elections are traced: the Liberal Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte, the Social-Democrat minister of 
foreign affairs Frans Timmermans and the two main 
opposition leaders Alexander Pechtold of the pro-
European Liberal Democrats and Geert Wilders of the 
Eurosceptic Freedom Party. A focus on these leaders 
ensures balance and variety across the political land-
scape and maximizes what we can learn from this 
study (Stake, 1995). The 2014 EP elections increased 
political attention for the EU and situating our study in 
the months surrounding this event enabled us to 
source enough speeches in which the four leaders ad-
dress the issue at stake. 
2. Responsive Leadership in a European Setting 
In recent decades, Europe has taken centre stage in the 
public debate in many member states. After decades of 
‘permissive consensus’, the current public debate is 
characterised by a high degree of polarisation. Increas-
ingly, the domestic political agenda is occupied by Eu-
ropean issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Despite at-
tempts of political leaders to depoliticize the public 
debate, the increasing competences of the EU, com-
petitive party politics, and several crises have pushed 
the EU centre stage (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). While for 
decades the 'Europhile' elite has claimed to know what 
kind of Europe was best for its citizens (Startin & 
Krouwel, 2013), presently Euro sceptics insist they 
voice citizens’ true concerns. For both normative and 
empirical reasons, it is thus important to examine the 
extent to which leaders are responsive to the peoples’ 
preferences in the European domain.  
Despite widespread concerns about the gap be-
tween citizens and political elites, most empirical stud-
ies ‘find very little evidence for allegations that political 
elites are out of step with the masses when it comes to 
EU policies’ (Steenbergen et al., 2007, p.30; cf. Arnold 
et al., 2012; Dekker & Den Ridder, 2011; Walczak & 
Van der Brug, 2012). This seems to be the case both in 
terms of the pro/anti-European positions, left/right 
ideological leanings as well as the prioritisation of is-
sues. However, within this general pattern, national, 
partisan, and individual-level variations in the strength 
of the party/voter connection do exist (Best, Budge, & 
Mcdonald, 2012; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007): 
the congruence between leaders and the public is 
stronger in proportional representative systems. 
Moreover, the likeliness of voters adopting party elites’ 
positions is increased when the voter is highly attached 
to the party (Lindeboom, 2012; Ray, 2003). Finally, Car-
ruba (2001) finds that while overall they approximate 
the public’s preferences, elites generally take more ex-
treme positions. The state of the art in academic re-
search is thus all but conclusive about the gap between 
political elites and their constituents that features so 
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dominantly in the public debate on Europe. In this pa-
per, we introduce a different way of looking at congru-
ence that may shed light on this discrepancy.  
The dominant way to measure leader-follower con-
gruence in academic literature is to establish the over-
lap in issue saliency and ideological distance (Golder & 
Stramsky, 2010; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Linde-
boom, 2012). Overlap in issue saliency concerns the ex-
tent to which leaders and voters agree on what issues 
are most important and pressing and should be priori-
tized (Verba & Nie, 1972). Ideological distance refers to 
the extent to which leaders and voters share a position 
on an ideological scale like the traditional left/right or 
pro/anti EU scale. Both measures are usually estab-
lished through large-scale survey research like the Eu-
robarometer.  
These measures, however, are limited in three 
ways. Firstly, congruence in issue saliency may estab-
lish whether leaders and their followers see the same 
issue as important, but does not indicate whether it is 
perceived as positive or negative, why it is seen as sali-
ent or how it should be solved. Ideological distance 
does suggest a very broad preferred policy direction 
but is unable to reveal whether leaders and followers 
agree on specific measures or why. In addition, the 
survey-questions used to establish issue saliency and 
ideological distance have the disadvantage of being 
formulated top-down by the researcher and not allow-
ing citizens much room to tell their own stories. More-
over, survey questions are often one-dimensional and 
do not allow for nuanced or ambivalent responses 
(Schaffer, 2010), nor do they tap into the substantive 
reasoning and rationale behind people’s perceptions 
on contentious issues (Gaxie et al., 2011; Van In-
glegom, 2014).  
In this paper, we introduce a third and more intri-
cate measure of congruence: narrative congruence. 
This measure captures leaders’ and followers’ evalua-
tion of the issues they raise, and their preferred direc-
tion for solution. In addition, narrative congruence is a 
more qualitative measure that tracks the arguments 
and storylines used by leaders and citizens to support 
their position. As it delves deeper into the way people 
make sense of the world, this measure potentially offers 
a more powerful reflection of their European beliefs. 
The three forms of congruence are compatible and 
hierarchically organized in terms of how detailed and 
far-reaching the meeting of minds is that they measure 
(see Figure 1). While congruence in issue saliency indi-
cates that there is a shared concern and ideological 
congruence signals actors’ general political leanings, 
narrative congruence builds on this information and 
adds knowledge concerning why actors perceive issues 
as positive or negative, how different issues relate to 
one another, and specifies actors’ preferences on spe-
cific directions for solution. The higher leaders climb in 
this hierarchy of congruence, the more intricate and 
complete the overlap with their followers’ views will 
be. Moreover, as democratic theory suggests, this may 
mean that it is more closely related to the support 
leaders receive. 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchy of congruence. 
In studies on congruence, only limited attention has 
been paid to its consequences for citizens’ support 
(Esaiasson & Wlezien, 2016), even though the relation-
ship is often implicitly assumed. Public support may en-
tail many different things, like citizens’ satisfaction with 
leaders’ actions or confidence in their leadership (Levi 
& Stoker, 2000; Miller & Listhaug, 1999; Norris, 2011). 
This study focuses on credibility as an indicator of fol-
lowers’ support because it is most closely related to 
congruence. Studies show, for instance, that the more 
leaders voice peoples’ thoughts, the more convincing 
their problem analysis and concern for citizens’ views 
are (cf. Mayne & Hakhverdian, forthcoming). Credibility 
consists of three dimensions: perceived competence, 
trustworthiness, and caring (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 
1969). Competence relates to leaders’ knowledge and 
skills: do citizens think they offer the right problem 
analysis and know what needs to be done (O’Keefe, 
1990)? Trustworthiness entails whether voters believe 
leaders are honest and reliable (Hovland, Janis, & Kel-
ley, 1953). Caring means that leaders are empathetic 
towards their voters’ problems, and that they take 
their interests at heart (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). Of 
the three dimensions, caring in particular seems rele-
vant, as it deals specifically with the question of 
whether voters feel their leaders relate to their con-
cerns. 
3. Methods 
The different levels of congruence between leaders’ 
and citizens’ narratives of Europe will be established 
using the technique of cognitive mapping, while citi-
zens’ support for the party leaders is determined 
through survey-research.  
3.1. Cognitive Mapping 
Cognitive mapping is used in political science, social 
psychology and organizational studies to uncover peo-
ples’ beliefs (Axelrod, 1976; Bougon, Weick, & Brink-
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horst, 1977; Van Esch, 2014; Young & Schafer, 1998). 
Cognitive maps consist of concepts and the causal and 
utility relationships between them that together make 
up an actor’s belief system. Causal relations refer to 
the relationship between cause and effect or means 
and ends, while utility relations determine whether a 
concept is valued positively or negatively in a norma-
tive sense. When these concepts and relations are rep-
resented graphically, the concepts are depicted as 
points and the relations as arrows (see Figure 2).1 
The cognitive maps of Dutch citizens were derived 
from a sample of 300 adults, enlisted randomly via a 
commercial polling agency. The maps were elicited di-
rectly via the web application DART, from two weeks 
prior to the European Parliament elections of May 
2014 until a week after. A freehand approach was used 
as this is the most efficient and valid way (Hodgkinson, 
Maule, & Bown, 2004). Respondents were first asked 
to select seven out of a list of 50 pre-defined concepts 
that in a pilot were found to be associated with Euro-
pean integration by Dutch citizens and experts. Subse-
                                                          
1 Figures 2–5 show an excerpt of the leaders’ maps using only 
the concepts also present in the maps of their followers, indi-
cating the overlapping relations in dark-grey arrows. Only the 
most salient relations from the voters’ map are shown in 
light-grey arrows with the exact limit dependent on the size 
of the map.  
quently, respondents drew arrows between the con-
cepts to indicate how, in their eyes, these concepts 
were linked. The direction of the arrow indicates the 
direction of the causal effect (cause → effect) while the 
colour of the arrow indicates whether the effect is 
deemed to be positive (green) or negative (red). This 
allowed respondents a choice of nearly 5000 different 
relations to compose their cognitive map from. In addi-
tion, respondents were asked to complete a short sur-
vey about their demographic characteristics and politi-
cal behaviour. Respondents’ answers concerning the 
party they intended to vote for in the 2014 EP elections 
were used to aggregate their individual cognitive maps 
into a collective map of the followers of the respective 
party leader. This focus on party supporters results 
from our interest in the responsiveness of political 
leaders to their constituents’ views. 
The cognitive maps of the Dutch national political 
leaders are based on three public speeches or inter-
views concerning Europe held between 03-11-2012 
and 02-09-2014. Only speeches that addressed the EU 
specifically and substantially were selected until 
enough data was gathered to draw a cognitive map 
from.2 
                                                          
2 For the leader of the Social-Democrat party, Diederik Sam-
som, not enough data was available. For Pechtold, the party 
bureau was contacted to obtain enough speeches.  
 
 
Figure 2. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Pechtold and D66 voters. Source: Pechtold (2012, 2014a, 2014b). 
 
Overlapping relations Relations in Pechtold’s map Relations in followers’ map (saliency ≥3) 
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The selection thus represents the limited available data 
from the period surrounding the 2014 EP elections. To 
create the cognitive maps, causal and utility relation-
ships alluded to by leaders are manually coded from 
the selected texts, the coding was transparently and 
digitally documented in CM software MAPS.3 To make 
comparison between the leaders’ and citizens’ maps 
possible, concepts in the maps of the leaders were 
standardised using the same 50 pre-defined concepts 
presented to the citizens (Laukkanen & Wang, 2015). 
The standardisation results in an abstraction of the 
leaders’ views that ensures that the map is a reflection 
of their more general view of European integration. An 
additional 32 concepts were identified in the speeches 
of the leaders that represented distinctly different is-
sues than those presented to their constituents. To 
draw the maps, network software Gephi was used 
(Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009). All in all, this re-
sulted in maps of 83 to 180 relations per leader. 
Cognitive maps can be analysed in various ways. 
The relative strength of ideas is established by their sa-
liency (S)—the frequency with which they are men-
tioned. The more salient a relation, the larger it ap-
pears in the map (see Figure 2). In addition, scholars 
may study the ‘consequent paths’ feeding out of a con-
cept into other concepts as well as the value of these 
relations (positive, negative, non-existent).4 These 
analyses inform leaders’ scores on the three different 
forms of congruence. Congruence in issue saliency was 
measured by establishing the overlap of the concepts 
used by the leaders and voters and the overlap in how 
salient these concepts were in their maps. The average 
of these two is taken as the measure of issue saliency. 
With regard to ideological distance, the paper focuses 
on the pro/anti EU dimension. To calculate this meas-
ure, we categorised all concepts as pro-European (for 
instance: the Euro), anti-European (splitting up the EU) 
or EU-neutral (political stability), and as generally posi-
tive (social justice), negative (recession) and neutral 
(debate).5 The pro/anti EU scale was constructed by at-
                                                          
3 For the CM coding rules, see Wrightson (1976). All texts 
were double coded by two of the authors.  
4 The value of a relationship (positive, negative, non-existent) 
is indicated by a +, - or 0. Only negative saliency scores and 
those above 1 are noted in Figures 2–5. Concepts linked via a 
positive consequent path to a positively valued concept, or 
via a negative consequent path to a negative concept are 
positive. Concepts positively feeding into a negative concept, 
or negatively feeding into a positive concept are negative.  
5 Two coders (including one of the authors) categorized the 
50 pre-set concepts independently in the realm of another 
study. Two of the authors independently coded the 32 addi-
tional concepts from the leaders’ maps. Overall, the inter-
coder reliability of the European/Anti-European and Posi-
tive/Negative dimensions was respectively 0,96 and 0,71 
(Cohen’s Kappa) representing an excellent and good inter-
coder reliability (Gwet, 2012).  
tributing one point to the scale when a causal relation 
implied a positive reference to the EU and deducting 
one point when a causal relation implied a negative 
reference to the EU. Finally, this score was divided 
through the total number of times European concepts 
were connected to come up with a comparative meas-
ure that ranges from -1 to 1. The difference between 
the scores of the leaders and followers results in the 
ideological distance. The narrative congruence be-
tween the leaders and their followers is established by 
qualitatively comparing leaders’ and followers’ maps. 
To structure this analysis, we followed four steps. First-
ly, we established how many direct relations between 
two concepts are identical in the leaders’ and follows’ 
map. In addition, salient (indirect) relations linking mul-
tiple concepts were compared to see if leaders and fol-
lowers arrive at similar conclusions. The third step in-
volved a search for directly contradicting arguments. 
Finally, by analysing the utility relations, we established 
the overlap in how leaders and followers evaluated the 
shared concepts in their maps. Although quantification 
cannot capture the full meaning of this analysis and the 
indirect relations are only studied qualitatively, some 
frequencies are provided as a tentative proxy for the 
outcome of this analysis. As the technique of cognitive 
mapping has not been used to measure congruence 
before, for all measures, leaders’ ranking is used to de-
termine what scores are interpreted as high or low. 
3.2. Measuring Support through Survey Research 
The credibility of Pechtold, Rutte, Timmermans and 
Wilders was derived from an existing survey on credi-
ble political leadership that was administered by Cen-
terData to the LISS panel (Van Zuydam, 2014). This 
panel provides a representative sample of the Dutch 
population. In the survey, 3295 respondents were 
asked to evaluate all cabinet ministers of cabinet Rutte 
II and parliamentary party leaders active at the same 
time. The questionnaire was administered three times: 
in August 2013, January 2014, and June 2014. The re-
sponse rate was respectively 78.5, 82.2 and 81.5 per-
cent. Four leaders were randomly selected for each re-
spondent to evaluate. Cross referencing the leaders 
evaluated by the respondents with their vote in the 
2014 European elections resulted in a subset of 36 to 56 
evaluations for each of the four leaders in this study.  
We measured the credibility of the leaders on three 
dimensions: their perceived competence, trustworthi-
ness, and caring in the eyes of their (potential) voters. 
For each leader they professed to know, respondents 
were presented six Likert items (6-point with in addi-
tion a “don’t know” answer); two for each credibility 
dimension. The responses on these items in the three 
waves were integrated, which resulted in an average 
overall score for each respondent on each of the six 
items. Subsequently, the answers for each dimension 
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were combined into an additive scale, resulting in 
three indices for each leader: a competence, trustwor-
thiness, and caring index. Chronbach’s α based on the 
aggregative, overall score for each studied leader and 
each index—in total thus 12 indices—was in most cas-
es between 0.8, and 0.96. Only twice was Chronbach’s 
α lower at 0.786 and 0.794. In addition, a total credibil-
ity index was calculated if valid responses on at least 
four of the six items were available. Chronbach’s α for 
this scale ranged between 0.914 and 0.962 for all four 
leaders. These indices were used to establish leaders’ 
credibility according to citizens.  
4. Congruence 
4.1. Issue Saliency and Ideological Distance 
The cognitive maps of Alexander Pechtold and his fol-
lowers scored highest in terms of issue saliency con-
gruence. Of the 39 concepts used by Pechtold, 28 are 
also present in the map of the supporters of his party. 
In 57 percent of these cases, they also agree on the 
relative saliency (in terms of relative rank) of the issues 
(see Table 1). This agreement covers key concepts like 
European integration, the common European interest 
and democracy. D66 voters are, however, much more 
concerned about economic political stability, economic 
growth, freedom and peace than Pechtold, who rates 
free trade as more salient. The beliefs of Mark Rutte 
are slightly less representative of his supporters’ at an 
overlap of 26 issues. This amounts to 68 percent con-
gruence, but does not include issues salient to his vot-
ers like the Euro, labour-migration or human rights. 
Their mutual agreement on the relative saliency of the 
shared concerns is only 54 percent and also predomi-
nantly involves low-saliency concepts. 
Geert Wilders ranks third with a concept overlap of 
64 percent of his map. This congruence includes salient 
concepts to his followers like recession, the Dutch in-
terest, having the Euro and the Dutch exit from the EU. 
The overlap in issue saliency is, however, only 50 per-
cent and includes only low ranking concepts. Former 
minister of Foreign Affairs, Timmermans, has the low-
est score in issue saliency overlap: despite the high 
number of concepts (58) in his map, the concept over-
lap is only 50 percent. In terms of relative saliency 
Timmermans’ speech-acts are also the least repre-
sentative at a score of 36 percent. While Timmermans 
is more concerned with solidarity, European identity 
and the status of the EU in the world, his voters stress 
issues like economic growth, peace, social security, 
equality and political stability.  
The leaders and their followers also differ consider-
ably on their evaluation of the EU measured in terms of 
ideological distance (see Table 2). Although the leaders 
and their followers agree on whether they are pro- or 
anti-European, in all instances the leaders hold strong-
er views. Even Rutte, who is closest to his voters with a 
difference of 0.15, is more positive than his followers. 
Pechtold’s score is 0.23 more positive than his voters 
and Timmerman’s score exceeds his followers’ by al-
most double that. The most extreme difference is 
found for Wilders, who is the only leader with a clear 
anti-EU perspective, at a hefty 0.84 points more anti-
European than his followers. 
Overall, these findings show that congruence in 
terms of issue saliency for these leaders and followers 
is at a reasonable level and only dips below 50 percent 
for Timmermans. The scores on ideological distance 
corroborate the conclusions of previous studies as they 
reveal similar ideological leanings between leaders and 
followers with the leaders taking more—and some-
times far more—extreme positions (Carruba, 2001). 
However, moving up in the hierarchy of congruence al-
so reveals a declining level of congruence. This raises 
the question whether studying the narratives underly-
ing leaders and followers’ positions may reveal further 
dissonance and reflect the feeling of disjunction re-
ported by Dutch voters. 
Table 1. Issue saliency congruence (score and rank). 
Issue Saliency 
Leader 
Concept overlap 
(% of leader’s map) 
Saliency Overlap 
(% in relative rank) 
Average 
Pechtold-D66 72 (1) 57 (1) 64.5 (1) 
Rutte-VVD 68 (2) 54 (2) 60.0 (2) 
Wilders-PVV 64 (3) 50 (3) 57.0 (3) 
Timmermans-PvdA 50 (4) 36 (4) 42.0 (4) 
Table 2. Ideological distance (score and rank). 
 
Leader Followers Ideological Distance 
Rutte-VVD 0,69 0,54 0,15 (1) 
Pechtold-D66 0,79 0,56 0,23 (2) 
Timmermans-PvdA 0,9 0,46 0,44 (3) 
Wilders-PVV -0,84 -0,0049 0,84 (4) 
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4.2. Narrative Congruence 
Reviewing the cognitive maps in a qualitative and holis-
tic manner by looking at the causal and utility relations, 
reveals that the narrative congruence between Pech-
told and the D66 voters is the highest amongst our set 
of leaders (Table 3). Of the 57 unique direct relations 
between concepts, twelve are also present in his fol-
lowers’ map, whereby the positive links between Euro-
pean integration, the common European interest and 
prosperity as well as between free-trade, prosperity, 
democracy and voice are the most salient to Pechtold 
(Figure 2). Moreover, agreement exists on the positive 
effect of European integration on peace and that free-
trade is in the common European interest, arguments 
that are salient in the mind of the D66 voters. It is 
therefore clear that both Pechtold and his followers 
are principled pro-Europeans for many of the same 
reasons. The D66 voters, however, also support the EU 
because it fosters political stability, freedom, the pro-
tection of human rights and has led to the establish-
ment of the euro. In Pechtold’s mind, these effects are 
also positively but only indirectly associated with the 
EU. Moreover, when taking into account the indirect 
relations in the maps, more similarities appear. Firstly, 
Pechtold states that by fostering free trade the EU not 
only promotes economic growth, but also peace, and 
employment and thereby public support for the EU. His 
supporters agree with this positive evaluation of free 
trade for similar reasons, with part of the effects being 
mediated by the existence of the Euro which in their 
eyes provides a strong argument in favour of European 
integration, as it fosters free trade, freedom, and eco-
nomic growth. 
There is, however, one marked contradiction be-
tween Pechtold’s and his followers’ narrative on Eu-
rope: their evaluation of the relationship between Eu-
ropean integration and democracy. While the D66 
voters feel Europe contributes positively to democracy, 
Pechtold identifies a negative relationship. Democracy 
is a positive value and salient concern for both Pech-
told and his supporters: they agree that democracy 
provides citizens with the opportunity to participate 
and voice their preferences, and while Pechtold feels 
that having a voice in politics brings equality, prosperi-
ty and is in peoples’ interest, his followers positively re-
late democracy to political stability and free trade. The 
contradiction in their belief of how the EU affects de-
mocracy is therefore an important one, although Pech-
told and his voters agree that increasing the EU’s pow-
ers will enhance democracy.  
Finally, reviewing the normative dimension of the 
narratives by analysing the utility statements of Pech-
told and the D66 followers, reveals an overlap of 82 
percent in their evaluation of shared concepts. Overall, 
the cognitive map of Pechtold thus shows a reasonable 
level of narrative congruence with the map of his fol-
lowers. 
The maps of Rutte and his followers contain eight 
identical relations (Figure 3). Firstly, their mild support 
of European integration relies in part on their shared 
belief that European integration serves both the Dutch 
and the common European interest. Moreover, Rutte 
believes that the EU stimulates free trade, which posi-
tively affects economic growth, which is in the com-
mon European interest and ultimately promotes pros-
perity. This exact line of reasoning is found in the 
narrative of the VVD voters, although it is less salient to 
them. Moreover, both maps contain the argument that 
recession has a negative effect on prosperity and the 
liberal idea that freedom is in the best interest of The 
Netherlands. The most noticeable difference is that 
Rutte makes no mention of the Euro while this is one 
of the most salient concepts in the mind of the VVD 
voters. They are ambiguous about its value, however, 
as they consider the Euro to positively contribute to 
economic growth, but to have an overall negative ef-
fect on prosperity. In contrast to Rutte, their overall as-
sessment of the EU on prosperity is thereby negative. 
The one direct contradiction in the map of Rutte and 
his followers also concerns the economic effects of the 
EU and lies in the fact that Rutte feels European inte-
gration has no effect on financial stability, while his 
voters feel it has a positive effect. 
Table 3. Narrative congruence (score and rank). 
Narrative Congruence 
 
Leader 
Direct relation 
overlap 
Direct relation 
contradiction 
Evaluation overlap 
(% of shared 
concepts) 
Overall 
Pechtold-D66 12/57 (1) 1/57 (2) 82 (1) 4 (1) 
Rutte-VVD 8/99 (3) 1/99 (1) 73 (3) 7 (2) 
Wilders-PVV 8/81 (2) 3/81 (4) 79 (2) 8 (3) 
Timmermans-PvdA 7/130 (4) 3/130 (3) 69 (4) 11 (4) 
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Figure 3. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Rutte and VVD voters. Source: Rutte (2013, 2014a, 2014b). 
Overall, the VVD voters also identify much more non-
economic benefits of Europe than their leader, such as: 
equality, social cohesion, political stability and democ-
racy. 
A further indirect similarity in argumentation re-
lates to the type of Europe Rutte and his followers en-
vision. In his speeches, Rutte speaks abundantly about 
subsidiarity which he positively associates with innova-
tion, free trade, efficiency and employment. The cen-
trality of this concept in his map indicates that Rutte 
favours a strong autonomous role for the member 
states and generally objects to giving Europe more 
powers. His supporters think a federal Europe would 
enhance political stability and social cohesion, but 
overall also favour an intergovernmental Europe. They 
associate European integration predominantly with the 
concept ‘Europe of the states’ which they feel is 
strongly in the European interest, and they identify 
drawbacks to European leadership and an increase in 
European powers.  
In terms of the normative evaluation of the shared 
issues in their maps, Rutte and his followers value 73 
percent of the concepts the same. This congruence 
concerns concepts that are very salient to the voters, 
and contributes to Rutte’s scores on narrative congru-
ence. Overall his score is thereby considerable but still 
substantially lower than Pechtold’s. 
Wilders’ narrative congruence with his followers is 
similar and only slightly lower than that of Rutte. Of 
the 81 unique direct relations in his map, eight are also 
present in the map of his supporters. Reflecting their 
shared Eurosceptic attitude these relations include the 
argument that European integration is against the 
Dutch interest as it leads to a loss of sovereignty, de-
mocracy, and political stability as well as that national 
pride is in the Dutch interest (Figure 4). The PVV sup-
porters also identify several positive consequences of 
the EU, one being that it reduces poverty. Yet overall 
they share their party leader’s negative assessment of 
the EU and agree that leaving the Union (Nexit) would 
serve the Dutch interest. While Wilders feels a Nexit 
would stimulate economic growth and employment, 
his supporters argue it would counter the recession 
and increase Dutch sovereignty. Some PVV voters fear, 
however, that leaving the EU could lower Dutch na-
tional pride and increase poverty. Finally, the PVV 
leader and his followers also share the idea that the 
Euro is not in the common European interest as it in-
creases poverty and induces the provision of aid to 
other states. However, while Wilders only identifies 
negative effects of the introduction of the Euro, his 
supporters also see some benefits as, in their mind, it 
stimulates free trade and thereby economic growth. 
Overall Wilders and his followers share a negative 
evaluation of the Euro, and wish the Dutch would have 
retained their national currency. While Wilders feels 
this would have increased the Dutch national sense of 
pride, his followers argue it would have safeguarded fi-
nancial stability. 
Apart from the eight overlapping relations, the 
maps of Wilders and his followers contain three con-
trasting claims. Firstly, while Wilders denies a relation-
ship exists between European integration and peace, 
his supporters argue the EU did foster peace. In addi-
tion, a direct contradiction exists between Wilders’ ar-
gument that European integration has contributed to  
Overlapping relations Relations in Rutte’s map Relations in followers’ map (saliency ≥2) 
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Figure 4. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Wilders and PVV voters. Source: Wilders (2013, 2014a, 2014b). 
the recession and his followers’ positive assessment of 
the EU’s effect. Finally, while the PVV supporters feel 
the EU is neither in their own nor the Dutch interest, 
some feel it does serve the common European interest 
whereas Wilders is adamant that it does not. However, 
since all of these concepts and relations are not very 
salient to either map, the differences are relatively in-
consequential for the broader narrative congruence. 
Further evidence of a reasonable level of narrative 
congruence is provided by the relatively high overlap 
(79 percent) in how Wilders and his followers evaluate 
the concepts they share. So, although Wilders focusses 
more on the issue of sovereignty and democracy, and 
his supporters take a predominantly economic view—
in terms of narrative—their views of Europe still show 
a reasonable alignment. 
Finally, there is a stark difference in Timmerman’s 
narrative on Europe and that of his supporters. Firstly, 
of the 130 unique relations in his map only seven find 
an exact match in the map of the PvdA voters, while in 
three instances a direct contradiction exists (Figure 5). 
Amongst the seven overlapping relations are the ar-
guments that European integration fosters peace, the 
protection of human rights and equality, as well as in-
creases the powers of the EU. However, while Tim-
mermans feels the EU fosters economic growth his 
supporters are ambiguous about the effects of Europe-
an integration on economic growth. They do agree 
with their leader that free trade leads to economic 
growth, but in contrast to Timmermans do not associ-
ate free trade with European integration in any way. 
Furthermore, Timmermans also sees positive associa-
tions between the EU and social security, political sta-
bility, freedom, and the opportunity for people to voice 
their concerns whereas his supporters do not.  
What broadens the divide even further is that the 
PvdA voters in our sample were very concerned about 
the Euro, which in their eyes had a positive impact on 
economic growth and efficiency but a negative effect 
on social justice, free trade, freedom, and sovereignty. 
Timmermans, however, makes no mention of the Euro. 
Timmermans and his followers do agree, however, that 
(more) European integration and an increased status in 
the world would promote financial stability and securi-
ty. Additional differences result from Timmermans’ 
strong association of European integration with solidar-
ity. In his view solidarity fosters European integration 
and is in the common European and Dutch national in-
terest. Solidarity also informs the formation of a Euro-
pean identity, increases financial stability and Europe’s 
status in the world, which in turn fosters political sta-
bility and security. In contrast, the PvdA voters in our 
sample mention solidarity only once, and feel Europe-
an integration has in fact reduced solidarity. Finally, the 
considerable divergence in Timmermans and his fol-
lowers’ narrative on Europe integration is illustrated by 
the fact that they do not share his strong belief that 
the EU is a major contributor to the common European 
and Dutch national interest. 
The differences in argumentation already signals a 
stronger divergence in how Timmermans and his sup-
porters value the topics they both discuss compared to 
Overlapping relations Relations in Wilders’ map Relations in followers’ map (saliency ≥3) 
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Figure 5. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Timmermans and PvdA voters. Source: Timmermans (2013, 
2014a, 2014b). 
other leaders. Moreover, the differences include sev-
eral issues that are salient in the minds of the PvdA 
voters like social security, protection of human rights, 
equality and free trade. Thereby the overlap between 
the European narratives of Timmermans and his fol-
lowers show the most considerable differences in this 
study. 
Looking at the narrative congruence for all leaders, 
it stands out that the direct overlap in relations is low. 
However, at the same time these leaders also hardly 
directly contradict their followers. Looking beyond the 
direct causal relations, our analysis shows that by dis-
playing a holistic image of their views a more in-depth 
comparison between leaders and voters is possible. 
The analysis reveals for instance that Pechtold and his 
followers are staunch advocates of European integra-
tion because of its positive economic effects but that 
they disagree about its consequences for democracy. 
Rutte and his followers also agree that the EU improves 
the Dutch economy, but favour a Europe of the states 
and disagree on the role of the Euro. For Wilders, his 
stronger opposition to the EU than that of his followers 
was also traced back to the fact that the PVV voters 
identify several positive effects of the EU and Euro 
where Wilders sees none. For Timmermans, the source 
of the divergence between his narrative and that of his 
followers emerges from their different views on the ef-
fects of European integration on economic growth and 
free trade, and the role of solidarity. Finally, the analy-
sis suggests that convergence in argumentation fosters 
alignment in terms of normative worldview.  
4.3. Credibility 
Turning to the credibility of the four leaders in the eyes 
of their supporters, our analysis reveals that Timmer-
mans’ average perceived competence, trustworthiness, 
and caring score ranges between 9.46 and 10.16, rank-
ing him first on all three dimensions. Consequently, his 
credibility ratings can be considered to be high to very 
high. This high standing includes the caring dimension 
which means that Timmermans is considered to con-
nect especially well with his party’s supporters’ con-
cerns and ideas. Rutte’s attributed scores on the three 
dimensions range between 8.22 and 9.21 (Table 4), a 
high score. Moreover, his perceived caring is also rela-
tively high according to his voters, meaning they feel 
Rutte empathizes with their concerns. 
In Pechtold’s case, the scores awarded to his compe-
tence, trustworthiness, and caring range between 7.55 
and 9.31. While he is thus attributed less credibility than 
Timmermans and Rutte, his credibility is still medium to 
high. A closer look at Pechtold’s evaluations reveals that 
his perceived caring scores lowest of the three dimen-
sions, meaning that his party’s supporters are not fully 
convinced that he understands their concerns and ideas.  
Overlapping relations Relations in Timmermans’ map Relations in followers’ map (saliency ≥2) 
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Table 4. Perceived credibility of the leaders (in score and rank). 
  
  
Competence Trustworthiness Caring Overall credibility 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Timmermans 10,16 (1) 2,04 9,67 (1) 2,14 9,46 (1) 2,48 28,24 (1) 6,8 
Rutte 9,21 (3) 2,24 8,44 (3) 2,7 8,22 (2) 2,53 25,66 (2) 7,15 
Pechtold 9,31 (2) 2,39 8,72 (2) 2,24 7,55 (3) 2,67 24,72 (3) 7,1 
Wilders 7,63 (4) 3,31 7,02 (4) 3,59 6,99 (4) 3,65 21,32 (4) 10,05 
Note: Credibility dimensions range between 2 and 12, total credibility between 4 and 36. 
Table 5. Summary of all the scores on congruence and credibility (in rank). 
  
Issue 
Saliency 
Ideological 
distance 
Narrative 
congruence 
Overall 
congruence 
Overall 
Credibility 
Pechtold-D66 1 2 1 1 3 
Rutte-VVD 2 1 2 2 2 
Wilders-PVV 3 4 3 3 4 
Timmermans-PvdA 4 3 4 4 1 
 
Wilders’ credibility, finally, is also medium, as the aver-
age scores on the three credibility dimensions range 
between 6.99 and 7.63. In particular, his followers 
judge his perceived caring as relatively low. Conse-
quently, it can be argued that Wilders is considered to 
only moderately relate to his party’s supporters con-
cerns and ideas. 
5. Conclusions 
This article started out by noting that academic studies 
find, at most, mixed evidence for the perceived gap be-
tween leaders’ and citizens’ views on Europe that fea-
tures so prominently in the public debate. Using the 
technique of cognitive mapping with its focus on the 
narrative underlying citizens’ and leaders’ positions, 
this study finds evidence of the existence of such a gap 
in the case of four Dutch leaders. While in terms of is-
sue saliency the congruence is mixed and ranges be-
tween 42 to 64.5 percent of leaders’ cognitive maps, 
the ideological distance between Timmermans and es-
pecially Wilders and their respective voters is consider-
able. Finally, the narrative congruence is far from com-
plete but only in the case of Timmermans and his 
followers a true disconnect in their stories of Europe 
exists. This shows that the hierarchy of congruence 
does indeed hold: moving up the hierarchy reveals 
more evidence of a gap between leaders and voters. 
More importantly, narrative congruence reveals the 
overlap and differences in the argumentation behind 
leaders’ and voters’ score on issue saliency and ideo-
logical distance, and thereby informs us why a gap be-
tween leaders’ and followers’ assessment of the EU ex-
ists, or not.  
In contrast, the study finds no support for the 
commonplace assumption that by being responsive to 
the will of the people, leaders will be seen as more 
credible by their followers. Particularly in the case of 
Timmermans, who is seen as the most credible and car-
ing by his party’s supporters, his low scores on all three 
forms of congruence are striking (Table 5). The scores 
for Pechtold show a similar lack of impact of congru-
ence on credibility as his speech-acts were most repre-
sentative of the views of his voters, but his perceived 
credibility and especially caring was lower than ex-
pected. For Wilders the discrepancy is smaller, as he 
showed a considerable lack in congruence for issue sa-
liency and ideological distance and a moderate narra-
tive congruence, and his credibility is seen to be low. 
Only for Rutte the congruence scores do line up with 
his perceived credibility. Overall, however, none of the 
measures of congruence aligns plausibly with leaders’ 
credibility in this study. Even in terms of caring, the sub-
dimension of credibility that is theoretically linked most 
clearly with congruence, the scores do not line up.  
This study also inspires some broader conclusions. 
Firstly, the study indicates that the technique of cogni-
tive mapping, and especially the narratives it unveils, 
provides an interesting complement to the methodo-
logical tool-box of scholars interested in responsive 
leadership. The measure offers valuable additional in-
sight in the normative evaluation of policy goals and in-
struments as well as into the argumentation behind 
leaders’ and followers’ position on contested issues like 
European integration. Secondly, although the lack of 
evidence for a connection between congruence and 
credibility is remarkable in light of commonplace as-
sumptions in the literature, this article only includes a 
limited number of cases and respondents. Moreover, 
future research should keep in mind that while nowa-
days European integration is a very salient subject in 
the public debate, voters may have very different 
things on their mind and develop issue-specific 
measures for rating the credibility of political leaders. 
Reflecting on the remarkable support for Timmermans, 
for instance, raises the question of his position on oth-
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er issues but also on the role of non-cognitive factors in 
assessing leaders’ credibility.  
All in all, further study is needed to establish to 
what extent the findings in this article hold in general. 
Nonetheless, it does show that narrative congruence 
and the technique of cognitive mapping offer a valuable 
and viable way to measure the responsiveness of politi-
cal leaders to the concerns of their followers. Moreover, 
in a timeframe in which voicing the will of the people is 
often seen as a prime commodity for political leaders, 
our findings—although tentative—may be a timely re-
minder that leadership is not only about reflecting the 
will of the people. It is also about taking the lead and 
guiding your followers into directions unknown. The 
case of Timmermans may indicate that in gaining the 
support of the people, this may be as much the missing 
link in European leadership as responsiveness. 
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